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Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254282
Engenharia de Software
Em relação a ferramentas CASE, é correto afirmar que:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254281
Engenharia de Software
Segundo Roger S. Pressman: “Ele tem um lugar definido
no trabalho da Engenharia de Software, pois produz um
padrão no qual os métodos para análise, projeto,
codificação, testes e manutenção podem ser colocados”.
O conceito acima refere-se ao paradigma
O conceito acima refere-se ao paradigma
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254280
Engenharia de Software
Em relação aos conceitos e fundamentos de engenharia
de software, é correto afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254279
Engenharia de Software
E ab (KLOC) exp (bb) é uma equação típica do modelo
COCOMO básico, onde “E” é o esforço aplicado em
pessoas-mês, KLOC é o número estimado de linhas de
código do projeto. O coeficiente ab e o expoente bb
referem-se a valores extraídos da tabela de classes de
projetos, de acordo com sua classificação em modo
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254278
Engenharia de Software
Analise os quadros abaixo, relativos às categorias de
atributos direcionadores de custo do modelo básico do
COCOMO:
Quadro 1 – Categoria de Atributo
I. Atributo do Produto II. Atributo do Hardware III. Atributo de Pessoal IV. Atributo de Projeto
Quadro 2 – Atributo Direcionador de Custo
1. Confiabilidade exigida do software 2. Tamanho do banco de dados da aplicação 3. Capacidade de engenharia de software 4. Uso de ferramentas de software 5. Cronograma de atividades de desenvolvimento exigido
A correta associação entre os elementos das duas tabelas é
Quadro 1 – Categoria de Atributo
I. Atributo do Produto II. Atributo do Hardware III. Atributo de Pessoal IV. Atributo de Projeto
Quadro 2 – Atributo Direcionador de Custo
1. Confiabilidade exigida do software 2. Tamanho do banco de dados da aplicação 3. Capacidade de engenharia de software 4. Uso de ferramentas de software 5. Cronograma de atividades de desenvolvimento exigido
A correta associação entre os elementos das duas tabelas é
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254276
Arquitetura de Software
Considerando as best practices em relação ao planejamento de projetos de softwares, é correto afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254275
Noções de Informática
Numa rede de computadores,
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254274
Banco de Dados
Em relação às linguagens de definição e manipulação de
dados:
Em um SGBD, em que a separação entre os níveis conceitual e interno são bem claras, é utilizada a linguagem ....I.... , para a especificação do esquema interno. Onde a separação entre os níveis interno e conceitual não é muito clara, o SGBD possui um compilador que permite a execução das declarações para identificar as descrições dos esquemas e para armazená-las no catálogo. Neste caso utiliza-se a ....II.... . No SGBD, cuja arquitetura utiliza os esquemas conceitual, interno e externo, é necessária a adoção da ....III.... .
Preenchem correta e respectivamente as lacunas I, II e III:
Em um SGBD, em que a separação entre os níveis conceitual e interno são bem claras, é utilizada a linguagem ....I.... , para a especificação do esquema interno. Onde a separação entre os níveis interno e conceitual não é muito clara, o SGBD possui um compilador que permite a execução das declarações para identificar as descrições dos esquemas e para armazená-las no catálogo. Neste caso utiliza-se a ....II.... . No SGBD, cuja arquitetura utiliza os esquemas conceitual, interno e externo, é necessária a adoção da ....III.... .
Preenchem correta e respectivamente as lacunas I, II e III:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254273
Arquitetura de Computadores
Em relação aos sistemas de arquivos é correto afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254272
Arquitetura de Computadores
Em relação à arquitetura de computadores, é correto
afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254271
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No geral, o texto
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254270
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
O pronome it, no final do texto, refere-se a
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254269
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Segundo o texto, a escolha de um órgão supervisor
multilateral da Internet poderia tornar o registro de domínio
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254268
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
In the third paragraph, such abuses have not occurred
means that
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254267
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No segundo parágrafo, should indica
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254265
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Ainda no primeiro parágrafo, os dois períodos Why should
the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? e It doesn't
control the registration of French and Chinese cars,
whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel
was. podem ser ligadas, sem alteração de sentido, pela
conjunção
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254264
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No primeiro parágrafo, reflects no more than the historical
accident of the Internet's origins significa
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254263
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No texto, a palavra que preenche corretamente a lacuna é
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254262
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No texto, o verbo que preenche corretamente a lacuna é
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254261
Banco de Dados
O SQL Server 2000 implementa três tipos de funções
definidas pelo usuário (UDF):
I. scalar valued, que retorna um único valor em resposta a cada uma das chamadas à função; II. inline table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS especifica uma tabela com suas colunas e tipos de dados; III. multi-statement table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS é seguida da palavra TABLE sem uma lista de colunas.
Está correto o tipo de UDF descrito em
I. scalar valued, que retorna um único valor em resposta a cada uma das chamadas à função; II. inline table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS especifica uma tabela com suas colunas e tipos de dados; III. multi-statement table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS é seguida da palavra TABLE sem uma lista de colunas.
Está correto o tipo de UDF descrito em
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