Questões de Concurso Comentadas para analista do banco central

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Q25600
Inglês Adjetivos | Adjectives , Oposto | Opposite , Vocabulário | Vocabulary , Sinônimos | Synonyms
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25600 Inglês
Imagem 020.jpg
Imagem 021.jpg
. In terms of meaning, it is correct to affirm that
Alternativas
Q25589
Raciocínio Lógico Geometria Básica ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25589 Raciocínio Lógico
. Um quadrado é cortado em 49 quadrados menores. Todos esses quadrados têm as medidas de seus lados, em centímetros, expressas por números inteiros positivos. Há exatamente 48 quadrados com área igual a Imagem 009.jpg. O número de resultados possíveis para expressar, emImagem 010.jpg , a medida da área do quadrado original é exatamente igual a
Alternativas
Q25587
Economia Sistema Financeiro Nacional , Setor Financeiro ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25587 Economia
. O subsistema normativo do Sistema Ffinanceiro Nacional inclui os seguintes órgãos ou entidades:
Alternativas
Q25585
Economia História Econômica e Economia Contemporânea , História Econômica Brasileira ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25585 Economia
. A crise econômica decorrente do grande aumento dos preços do petróleo, em 1973, teve como resposta, no Brasil, a adoção do II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (II PND). A execução de tal plano
Alternativas
Q25584
Economia Microeconomia , Teoria dos Jogos ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25584 Economia
. Num jogo com decisões simultâneas entre duas pessoas, há um Equilíbrio de Nash. Cada pessoa conhece previamente todas as estratégias possíveis e os retornos dos participantes para cada combinação de estratégias. Neste jogo, certamente,
Alternativas
Q25575
Economia Sistema Financeiro Nacional , Setor Financeiro ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25575 Economia
. O Banco Central do Brasil é o órgão executivo central do sistema financeiro e suas competências incluem
Alternativas
Q25560
Direito Constitucional Organização Político-Administrativa do Estado , Repartição de Competências Constitucionais ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25560 Direito Constitucional
. Determinado município aprovou uma lei estabelecendo horário de funcionamento do comércio local e das instituições bancárias instaladas naquele município. Essa lei é
Alternativas
Q25559
Direito Constitucional Ordem Econômica e Financeira , Finanças Públicas – Orçamento ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25559 Direito Constitucional
Considere as afirmativas a seguir, a respeito do Banco Central.

I - O Banco Central está impedido constitucionalmente de conceder empréstimos.

II - O Banco Central está investido constitucionalmente da competência de emitir
moeda e não pode delegar essa competência a nenhum outro órgão.

III - Caso pretenda regular a oferta de moeda, o Banco Central poderá comprar e vender títulos de emissão do Tesouro Nacional.

Está correto APENAS o que se afirma em
Alternativas
Q25558
Direito Constitucional Direitos Individuais - Remédios Constitucionais e Garantias Processuais , Ação Popular , Mandado de Injunção , Mandado de Segurança Coletivo , Habeas Data
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25558 Direito Constitucional
Na hipótese de o Banco Central vir a praticar ato manifestamente ilegal e lesivo ao patrimônio público, um cidadão brasileiro, indignado com o ocorrido e com o propósito de anular o referido ato, pode ajuizar
Alternativas
Q25557
Direito Constitucional Processo Legislativo , Espécies Normativas: Medida Provisória, Lei Delegada, Decreto Legislativo e Resolução ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25557 Direito Constitucional
Suponha que o Congresso Nacional tenha aprovado projeto de lei que aumenta a alíquota do IR, e o projeto foi encaminhado ao Presidente da República para sanção. O chefe do Poder Executivo, no entanto, insatisfeito com alguns dispositivos do projeto, decidiu editar medida provisória dispondo sobre a mesma matéria, reproduzindo alguns dos dispositivos do projeto de lei e alterando outros. Nesse caso hipotético, a medida provisória editada pelo Presidente da República é
Alternativas
Q25556
Direito Constitucional Poder Legislativo , Congresso Nacional ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25556 Direito Constitucional
Considerando o princípio da separação dos Poderes de acordo com a Constituição, analise as proposições a seguir.

I - A Câmara dos Deputados pode convocar o Presidente do Banco Central a prestar informações sobre assunto determinado.

II - O Presidente do Banco Central, subordinado ao Presidente da República, não está obrigado a atender à convocação de nenhuma das Casas do Poder Legislativo.

III - O Ministro da Fazenda pode, por sua iniciativa e mediante entendimentos com a Mesa diretora do Senado Federal, comparecer àquela Casa do Congresso Nacional para expor assunto de relevância de seu Ministério.

Está(ao) correta(s) APENAS a(s) proposição(ões)
Alternativas
Q25555
Direito Constitucional Organização Político-Administrativa do Estado , Repartição de Competências Constitucionais ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25555 Direito Constitucional
Um governador de estado sancionou projeto de lei dispondo sobre política de crédito no âmbito do estado que governa. Considerando a Constituição e a matéria sobre a qual dispõe o projeto, essa lei
Alternativas
Q25554
Direito Constitucional Controle de Constitucionalidade , Súmula Vinculante ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25554 Direito Constitucional
. Suponha que o STF tenha editado uma súmula vinculante afirmando a inconstitucionalidade de uma lei federal que afeta as atividades desenvolvidas pelo Banco Central. A este respeito, o Banco Central
Alternativas
Q25553
Direito Constitucional Processo Legislativo , Fase Introdutória – Iniciativa de Lei por Parlamentar e Extra-Parlamentar ,
Ano: 2010 Banca: CESGRANRIO Órgão: BACEN Prova: CESGRANRIO - 2010 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Conhecimentos Gerais - Todos os Cargos |
Q25553 Direito Constitucional
. Um deputado federal apresentou projeto de lei ordinária dispondo sobre provimento de cargo no serviço público federal. Este projeto foi aprovado pela Câmara dos Deputados; em seguida, pelo Senado, e, por fim, sancionado pelo Presidente da República. Essa hipótese está de acordo com a Constituição?
Alternativas
Q2254326
Inglês Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254326 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Segundo o texto, Henry Ford 
Alternativas
Q2254271
Inglês Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254271 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No geral, o texto
Alternativas
Q2254270
Inglês Pronomes | Pronouns ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254270 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
O pronome it, no final do texto, refere-se a
Alternativas
Q2254269
Inglês Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254269 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Segundo o texto, a escolha de um órgão supervisor multilateral da Internet poderia tornar o registro de domínio
Alternativas
Q2254268
Inglês Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254268 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
In the third paragraph, such abuses have not occurred means that
Alternativas
Q2254267
Inglês Verbos | Verbs , Verbos modais | Modal verbs ,
Ano: 2006 Banca: FCC Órgão: BACEN Provas: FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos | FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254267 Inglês
The Internet at Risk

    Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.
    The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that  ....51....
        The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.
        It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet. Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political. You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No segundo parágrafo, should indica
Alternativas
Respostas
1: E
2: B
3: A
4: E
5: B
6: E
7: C
8: E
9: A
10: D
11: D
12: E
13: A
14: B
15: B
16: E
17: D
18: C
19: A
20: C
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