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Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254277
Engenharia de Software
Considere a tabela abaixo (parcialmente preenchida), para cálculo de pontos de função:
Sabendo que a complexidade funcional (Simples, Média e
Complexa) é determinada em função da quantidade de
registros e/ou arquivos lógicos e itens de dados
referenciados, é correto afirmar que, aos totais atribuídos
a Arquivo Lógico Interno, Arquivo de Interface Externa e
Entrada Externa, correspondem, respectivamente, as
classificações
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254276
Arquitetura de Software
Considerando as best practices em relação ao planejamento de projetos de softwares, é correto afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254275
Noções de Informática
Numa rede de computadores,
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254274
Banco de Dados
Em relação às linguagens de definição e manipulação de
dados:
Em um SGBD, em que a separação entre os níveis conceitual e interno são bem claras, é utilizada a linguagem ....I.... , para a especificação do esquema interno. Onde a separação entre os níveis interno e conceitual não é muito clara, o SGBD possui um compilador que permite a execução das declarações para identificar as descrições dos esquemas e para armazená-las no catálogo. Neste caso utiliza-se a ....II.... . No SGBD, cuja arquitetura utiliza os esquemas conceitual, interno e externo, é necessária a adoção da ....III.... .
Preenchem correta e respectivamente as lacunas I, II e III:
Em um SGBD, em que a separação entre os níveis conceitual e interno são bem claras, é utilizada a linguagem ....I.... , para a especificação do esquema interno. Onde a separação entre os níveis interno e conceitual não é muito clara, o SGBD possui um compilador que permite a execução das declarações para identificar as descrições dos esquemas e para armazená-las no catálogo. Neste caso utiliza-se a ....II.... . No SGBD, cuja arquitetura utiliza os esquemas conceitual, interno e externo, é necessária a adoção da ....III.... .
Preenchem correta e respectivamente as lacunas I, II e III:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254273
Arquitetura de Computadores
Em relação aos sistemas de arquivos é correto afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254272
Arquitetura de Computadores
Em relação à arquitetura de computadores, é correto
afirmar:
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254271
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No geral, o texto
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254270
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
O pronome it, no final do texto, refere-se a
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254269
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Segundo o texto, a escolha de um órgão supervisor
multilateral da Internet poderia tornar o registro de domínio
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254268
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
In the third paragraph, such abuses have not occurred
means that
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254267
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No segundo parágrafo, should indica
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254265
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
Ainda no primeiro parágrafo, os dois períodos Why should
the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? e It doesn't
control the registration of French and Chinese cars,
whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel
was. podem ser ligadas, sem alteração de sentido, pela
conjunção
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254264
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No primeiro parágrafo, reflects no more than the historical
accident of the Internet's origins significa
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254263
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No texto, a palavra que preenche corretamente a lacuna é
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254262
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No texto, o verbo que preenche corretamente a lacuna é
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254261
Banco de Dados
O SQL Server 2000 implementa três tipos de funções
definidas pelo usuário (UDF):
I. scalar valued, que retorna um único valor em resposta a cada uma das chamadas à função; II. inline table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS especifica uma tabela com suas colunas e tipos de dados; III. multi-statement table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS é seguida da palavra TABLE sem uma lista de colunas.
Está correto o tipo de UDF descrito em
I. scalar valued, que retorna um único valor em resposta a cada uma das chamadas à função; II. inline table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS especifica uma tabela com suas colunas e tipos de dados; III. multi-statement table valued, cuja cláusula RETURNS é seguida da palavra TABLE sem uma lista de colunas.
Está correto o tipo de UDF descrito em
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254260
Banco de Dados
Informações úteis para o DBA diagnosticar problemas no
DB2 são geradas pelo utilitário
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254259
Banco de Dados
Uma transação envolvendo um banco de dados atingirá
seu término planejado com a execução de uma operação
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254258
Banco de Dados
A transferência de produtos entre as lojas da empresa
será melhor representada em um Modelo E/R por meio de
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Prova:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254257
Banco de Dados
NÃO é um princípio fundamental dos bancos de dados
distribuídos:
Conheça nossos planos