Questões de Concurso Sobre inglês

O texto a seguir é referência para as questões 27 a 31.

Rio de Janeiro (Reuters) – Brazil’s hugely popular television soap-operas usually deal with tear-filled romance. But the violence engulfing the country has upstaged the melodrama and taken one “telenovela” to the top of the ratings.

“Vidas Opostas” (Opposite Lives) is a hit with residents of Rio de Janeiro, where it is set, and around the country, despite complaints that people are weary of the real-life bloodshed and gory newscasts.

“We are showing things as they are in Rio – slums, drug traffickers, corrupt cops, rotten politicians, and common people caught in the middle of all that”, director Alexandre Avancini said.

The prime-time telenovela on the Rede Record network, shot partly in a real slum, has beat leading network Globo in the ratings several times when pitted against big league soccer games – an undeniable sign of popularity in Brazil.

A love-story is not missing. “Vidas Opostas” is the story of a young millionaire heir who loves a girl who lives in a slum, or favela. The favela is controlled by a drug gang that is in the middle of a turf with a rival group, which has the backing of a corrupt cop, a typical scenario in many of Rio’s 600-plus shanty towns.

(http://www.gulf-times.com)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)

Instruções: Considere o texto a seguir para responder às questões de números 37 a 44.

After nearly a decade of trying, Wal-Mart never cracked the country – failing to become the all-in-one shopping destination for Germans that it is for so many millions of Americans. Wal-Mart's problems are not limited to Germany. The retail giant has struggled in countries like South Korea and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits.

Some of Wal-Mart's problems stem from being a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

Among other things, Wal-Mart now cares (37) whether its foreign stores carry the name derived from its founder, Sam Walton, as the German Wal-Marts do. Seventy percent of WalMart's international sales come from outlets with names like Asda in Britain, Seiyu in Japan or Bompreço in Brazil. Far from being chastened by its setbacks, Wal-Mart is forging ahead with an aggressive program of foreign acquisitions. In a single week last fall, Wal-Mart completed the purchase of the Sonae chain in Brazil, bought a controlling stake in Seiyu of Japan, and became a partner in the Carcho chain in Central America.

Starting from scratch 14 years ago, Wal-Mart International [TO GROW] into a $63 billion business. It is the fastest-growing part of Wal-Mart, with nearly 30 percent sales growth in June, compared with the same month last year. Even subtracting one-time gains from acquisitions, it grew at nearly 12 percent, about double the rate of Wal-Mart's American stores.

Sustaining that pace is critical for Wal-Mart, because high fuel prices have helped sap the buying power of Americans. In June, store traffic in its home market declined. Wal-Mart estimated that its sales in the United States in stores open at least one year would increase only 1 percent to 3 percent in July.

Another problem that has afflicted Wal-Mart in several countries is its inability to compete with established discounters. The obvious lesson is to try to bulk up. In Brazil, Wal-Mart opened only 25 stores in its first decade there and struggled to compete against bigger local rivals. Then, in 2004, it bought Bompreço, giving it a presence in the country's poor, but fastgrowing, northeast.

Wal-Mart did not change the names of the stores, which range from neighborhood grocers to large American-style hypermarkets. But with 295 stores in Brazil, Wal-Mart now ranks third in the market, after Carrefour of France and the market leader, Companhia Brasileira de Distribução.

(Adapted from an article by Mark Landler and Michael Barbaro published in the New York Times, August 2, 2006)